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INTERPRETATION OF STATUTORY BONDS IN MISSOURI
DAVID R. KOCHERYt
The surety has been called the favorite of the law. It may
well be that the individual surety still occupies that preferred
status,1 the basic emolument of which is that the rule of stric-
tissimi juris is the controlling guide to judicial interpretations
of surety contacts. Where the surety assumes the guise of a
corporation, however, his fall from favor is often both abrupt
and resounding. This is not surprising inasmuch as the law
applied to corporations is seldom commensurate with that
applied to individuals. But nowhere is this legal divergence so
pronounced as in the law of suretyship.2
All states have statutes requiring that contractors of public
construction projects be bonded, as well as most or all public
officials. Missouri's basic statute applicable to the bonding of
public contractors is found in section 107.170 of the 1949 Mis-
souri Revised Statutes, and its counterparts with regard to
public officials appear in sections 107.010 to 107.160 of the same
compliation3 Unlike several states,4 Missouri has no remedial
tAssistant Professor of Law, University of Kansas City School of Law.
Sterling Law Fellow, Yale University, 1952-1953.
1. A gratuitous surety is a favorite of the law in Missouri. Citizens'
Trust Co. v. Tindle, 272 Mo. 681, 199 S.W. 1025 (1917) (citing cases);
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Goldsmith, 239 Mo. App. 188, 192 S.W.2d
1 (1945).
2. On the whole, as this article may disclose, the Missouri courts have
not been unobjective with sureties. When the particular surety, however,
asserts too many technical defenses or legal peccadilloes the court may
become downright antagonistic. For example, the court was apparently
irritated with the surety in Henry County v. Salmon, 201 Mo. 136, 100 S.W.
20 (1907).
3. Section 107.170 provides as follows:
Bond-public works contractor.
It is hereby made the duty of all officials, boards, commissions, com-
missioners, or agents of the state, or of any county, city, town, town-
ship, school, or road district in this state, in making contracts for public
work of any kind to be performed for the state, county, town, town-
ship, school or road district to require every contractor for such work
to execute a bond to the state, county, city, town, township, school or
road district, as the case may be, with good and sufficient sureties, and
in an amount to be fixed by said officials, boards, commissions, com-
missioners, or agents, and such bonds, among other conditions, shall be
conditioned for the payment of material, lubricants, oil, gasoline, grain,
hay, feed, coal and coke, repairs on machinery, groceries and foodstuffs,
equipment and tools, consumed or used in connection with the con-
struction of such work, and all insurance premiums, both compensation,
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statute providing for the liability of the surety when the terms
of its bond do not completely cover the duties of the person
bonded. Thus, when an action is brought on such a bond, the
following question is presented: Should the bond be enforced
according to its terms, or should it be enforced as though it
contained the provisions of the statute which required it regard-
less of its express terms? On the other hand, where the bond
covers conditions in addition to those provided in the statute,
should it be enforced according to the terms of the bond or
should it be restricted to the provisions of the statute?
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has quite recently
passed on the questions posed above. In Petition of Leon Keyser,
Inc.- an action was brought on a contractor's bond by material-
men who had supplied materials to a subcontractor. The bond
was required by statute6 since it purported to protect a school
district engaged in the construction of a public school. The
statute provided that the bond should be "conditioned upon
and all other kinds of insurance, on said work, and for all labor per-
formed in such work whether by subcontractor or otherwise.
Any amendments to this section since its enactment in 1895 did not affect
the portions with which this article is concerned. The amendments, with
the dates thereof, may be found in the historical note in Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 107.170 (Vernon 1952).
The sections cited in the text, supra, relating to officials' bonds are per-
tinent only if there be another law which requires a particular official to
provide a bond. Those sections requiring officials to provide bonds are
enumerated in Mo. ANN. STAT. c. 107, pp. 57-58 (Vernon 1952).
4. ALA. CODE tit. 41, §§ 52-53 (1940); Aniz. CODE ANN. § 12-315(1939); CAL. Gov. Con ANNOTATIONS § 1554 (1951); GA. CODE ANN. §
89-419 (1938); IDAHO CODE ANN. tit. 59, § 817 (1948); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 3-2512 (Burns Replacement 1946) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 64.5 (1949) ; MICH.
TAT. ANN. §§ 27.848,27.849 (1938) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 4033 (1942) ; MONT.
REv. CODE ANN. § 6-315 (1947); NEv. Comp. LAWS § 4893 (1929); N.Y.
PUBLIC OFFICEl's LAW § 11 (1948); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 109-1 (1952); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 1836 (Williams 1934); WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 777, 9933(1933).
5. 89 A.2d 9ui (N.H. 1952).
6. N.H. REv. LAWS c. 264, § 26 (1942):
Whenever a contract for any such public work involves an expendi-
ture of ten thousand dollars, the public authority making the same shall
require the contractor to give a bond with sufficient surety, in an
amount equal to eighty percent of the contract price, or of the estimated
cost of the work if no aggregate price is agreed upon, conditioned upon
the payment of all who would have liens under Sec. 25, and providing
that suit thereon may be maintained by the lienor against the surety.
Section 25 refers to prior sections giving liens to particular persons,
among which is section 15: "If a person shall by himself or others perform
labor or furnish materials to the amount of fifteen dollars or more, ...
by virtue of a contract with an agent, contractor or sub-contractor of the
owner, he shall have ... [a] lien .... "
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the payment of all who would have liens" if the work were
private. The plaintiffs, as materialmen, qualified under this
statutory provision. By the terms of the bond7 the surety under-
took to guarantee the "faithful performance of the contract"
and to indemnify the school district against loss suffered through
the principal's default. Also, the surety promised to pay only
those "persons who have contracts directly with the principal."
[Italics inserted]. Thus, despite a recited purpose to "comply
in full" with the statute, the express terms of the bond were
narrower than the provisions of the applicable statute, since
the statute required complete coverage of ". . . contractors and
sub-contractors for all labor performed or furnished, [and]
for all equipment hired... ."I The court, in awarding recovery
to the plaintiff under the bond, stated:
** .. The statute is to be read into the bond for the purpose
of affording rights to persons intended by the legislature to
be protected, ...especially when an intent to comply with
the, statute is evidenced by the bond. .... .
Another provision of the bond permitted the proper parties
to file claims with the surety under the bond at any time within
two years. The period provided by the New Hampshire statute
was ninety days to file, one year to petition.'0 The bond, in this
respect, was thus broader than the statute, and the surety
reversed his prior contention and now prayed that the statute
be read into the bond. But the court again found against the
surety and held that, although a claim was tardy under the
statute, still the extended time allowed by the bond would be
enforced as a common law obligation:
... [B]y the weight of authority such a "bond may be
conditioned more broadly than the statute requires, and if
* * .voluntarily given in consideration of the contract, its ex-
tra-statutory provisions may be enforced as a mon law
obligation." The statute does not prohibit the taking of
bonds broader than the statute requires, nor is any intention
shown to make the prescribed type of bond exclusive."
. ..While the statute defines the conditions which a bond
7. Petition of Leon Keyser, Inc., 89 A.2d 917, 920 (N.H. 1952).
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. N.H. REv. LAws c. 264, § 26 (1942) as amended, N.H. Laws 1943,
c. 182, N.H. Laws 1949, c. 71.
11. Petition of Leon Keyser, Inc., 89 A.2d 917, 919 (N.H. 1952), citing
and quoting 43 AM. JuR. 888, PuBLic WORKS AND CONTRACTS, § 146.
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shall contain, it does not prohibit the incorporation of
additional conditions.
[N] o reason is seen to deprive others of the protec-
tion which the parties to the bond intended and provided for,
and which the statute does not expressly prohibit.1
But the court held that the extended period of time for making
claims under the bond applies to benefit only those expressly
covered by the terms of the bond since this obligation is enforce-
able as a matter of the common law of contracts. Those who
did not have contracts directly with the principal could not
take advantage of this additional condition since their rights
depended solely upon the statute.13
How would the Keyser case have been disposed of in Mis-
souri?'4 It should be noted, in particular, that the provisions
of the bond in the Keyser case contained both (a) an express
invocation of the statute and (b) an express term in direct
conflict with the statute, i.e., the provision that the bond covered
only those persons having contracts directly with the principal. 5
I.
Missouri has traditionally labeled sureties as favorites of the
law. ' On the other hand, since Missouri has a long history of
permitting third-party beneficiaries to sue on contracts, the
courts have freely allowed laborers and materialmen to sue on
construction bonds, with or without a statute, when they are
expressly covered by the bond. 7 But when the bond is one
12. Id. at 920.
13. Id. at 921; cf. Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland v. Big
Three Welding Equipment Co., 249 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. 1952), reversing 244
S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951). Although the statutory bond contained
more liberal procedures for filing claims than the statute, the court refused
to enforce the extended provisions of the bond in favor of any of the
claimants since all the plaintiffs' claims clearly fell within the provisions
of the statute.
14. To review the cases of jurisdictions other than Missouri would be
a Herculean task to which the writer does not at present aspire. A great
deal of work has been done by the annotators of the American Law Reports.
See, for example, Notes, 89 A.L.R. 446 (1934); 77 A.L.R. 21, 126 (1932);
49 A.L.R. 534 (1927); 47 A.L.R. 502 (1927). And, for excellent treatment
of the general problem, particular reference is made to Hanna, Interpre-
tation of Statutory Bonds, 27 GEO. L.J. 1 (1936).
15. A discussion of the problems of interpretation where the bond con-
tains extrastatutory conditions will be found in Part II, infra.
16. See cases cited note 1 supra.
17. School District ex rel. Koken Iron Works v. Livers, 147 Mo. 580, 49
S.W. 507 (1899); St. Louis to Use of Glencoe Lime & Cement Co. v. Von
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required by statute, and the bond, unlike the statute, does not
in clear terms cover third parties, which consideration will
bear the more weight with the Missouri courts-the favoritism
to the surety or the avowed purpose and policy of the statute?
In a number of the early Missouri cases the decisions required
no express opinion as to the effect of the divergence between
bond and statute since there apparently was no such divergence
or, if there was, it was harmlessly slight. Properly considered
they turn out merely to be holdings that on the contracts as
executed the surety company had assumed the liability asserted
against it. Nevertheless, the courts felt constrained to state
generally that when parties execute a statutory bond they are
chargeable with notice of all provisions of the statute relating
to their obligation, and those provisions are to be read into the
bond as its terms and conditions.-5 On the other hand, when
the bond did not comply with all the fine minutiae of the
statute, and the plaintiff was covered by the terms of the bond
anyway, the courts have skirted any discussion of the effect of
the statute by holding that the bond is enforceable as a common
law obligation and not void. 9
Whereas, in the cases referred to above, the decisions have
appeared to be strikingly consistent where the problem did
Phul, 133 Mo. 561 (1896); St. Louis Public Schools v. Woods, 77 Mo. 197
(1883) ; St. Louis to Use of Contracting & Supply Co. v. Hill-O'Meara
Construction Co., 175 Mo. App. 555, 158 S.W. 98 (1913) ; Devers v. Howard,
88 Mo. App. 253 (1901).
Whether or not laborers and materialmen can properly be considered
third-party beneficiaries under construction bonds is beyond the scope of
this article. For an excellent discussion of their general protection, see
Campbell, Protection of Laborers and Materialmen Under Construction
Bonds, 3 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 1- 25, 201- 228 (1936).
18. St. Louis ex rel. Sears v. Southern Surety Co., 333 Mo. 180, 62 S.W.2d
432 (1933) ; State ex rel. Winebrenner v. Fidelity & Surety Co., 326 Mo. 684,
32 S.W.2d 572 (1930) ; Wright County ex rel. Elk Creek Tp. v. Farmers' &
Merchants' Bank, 30 S.W.2d 32 (Mo. 1930); Kansas City ex rel. Barlow v.
Robinson, 322 Mo. 1050, 17 S.W.2d 977 (1929); Albers v. Spencer, 236 Mo.
608, 139 S.W. 321 (1911); Kansas City to Use of Kansas City Hydraulic
Press Brick Co. v. Youmans, 213 Mo. 151, 112 S.W. 225 (1908); Henry
County v. Salmon, 201 Mo. 136, 100 S.W. 20 (1907); State e xrel. Grimm v.
Manhattan Rubber Mfg. Co., 149 Mo. 181, 50 S.W. 321 (1899); City of
Springfield v. Koch, 228 Mo. App. 511, 72 S.W.2d 191 (1934); Hughes v.
Keith, 267 S.W. 38 (Mo. App. 1924); City of St. Louis to Use of Con-
tracting & Supply Co. v. Hill-O'Meara Construction Co., 175 Mo. App. 555,
158 S.W. 98 (1913).
19. State to Use of Hubbard & Moffitt Commission Co. v. Cochrane, 264
Mo. 581, 175 S.W. 599 (1915); State ex rel. Jean v. Horn 94 Mo 162 7
S.W. 116 (1888) ; Nations v. Beard, 216 Mo. App. 33, 267 9.W. 19 (1924) ;
La Crosse Lumber Co. v. Schwartz, 163 Mo. App. 659, 147 S.W. 501 (1912).
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not require a determination, the decisions have become some-
what less than harmonious when the bond in question has been
more glaringly inconsistent with the statute. What has been
easy to state by way of dicta has been more difficult to apply in
some cases when the merits have been involved. Thus, in an
action on an appeal bond required by statute,20 where the bond
expressly covered the "prosecution of an appeal with due dili-
gence" only to the Missouri Supreme Court, the court allowed
a recovery despite the fact that the appeal could only have gone
to the Court of Appeals. 21 Since the bond statute named no
particular court, the inconsistent and restrictive language of the
bond was deemed of no effect, the court stating: "All statutory
bonds are to be construed as though the law requiring and
regulating them was written in them.' 22
In Eau-Claire-St. Louis Lumber Co. v. Banks,2 3 however,
another result was forthcoming. A bond had been given by a
contractor for the construction of a school building. The bond
did not contain the statutory clause protecting labor and mater-
ials.24 By its terms the bond merely guaranteed performance
by the contractor and promised to keep the school district harm-
less and indemnified in case of the contractor's failure to per-
form. In an action by materialmen on the bond it was held
that the bond was not a statutory bond, therefore third persons
not mentioned in the instrument could not recover. The court
related:
[I] n all the cases to which the attention of the court
has been directed, it has been held that, to enable third par-
ties not named in the bond or contract to sue on the bond, it
20. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 809 (1899).
21. Zellars v. National Surety Co., 210 Mo. 86, 108 S.W. 548 (1908).
During the operation of the bond the Legislature, by the Laws of 1901, had
re-shifted the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Courts
of Appeals.
22. Id. at 92, 108 S.W. at 549. Where a county sued for a penalty under
a dramshop bond required by statute [Mo. Rsv. STAT. § 7196 (1909)] to
cover the sale of liquor to habitual drunkards, the court allowed a recovery
despite the fact the bond did not encompass the statutory conditions:
It is now well-settled in this state that in construing statutory bonds
the general language of the bond must be interpreted in the light
by [sic] the statute pertaining to the subject-matter of the bond, that
such a statute is to be read into the bond, and that the sureties are
held to have contracted with a view to such statute.
Jackson County ex rel. Bryson v. Enright, 198 Mo. App. 527, 531, 201
S.W. 599, 600 (1918).
23. 136 Mo. App. 44, 117 S.W. 611 (1909).
24. Mo. REv. STAT. § 107.170 (1949). See note 3 supra.
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must clearly appear by the terms of the bond or contract,
that they are of the class covered by the conditions of the
bond. When they are they can sue, whether named in the
bond or not; when they are not, they have no right of action
on the bond.25
Thus the court ignored the fact that, in all probability, no bond
at all would have been given had it not been for the requirement
of the statute. The express terms of the bond were controlling.
Likewise, the court appears to have ignored the holding 0 and
language 7 of prior Missouri cases. Furthermore, in Citizens'
Trust Co. v. Tindle,28 the court again refused to expand the
express coverage of the bopd to comply with the statute. A
bank cashier had provided a bond so conditioned that the surety
would pay the bank for any damage occasioned by the cashier's
"faithfully performing all duties as such cashier of said Pemiscot
County Bank." The cashier embezzled money, and the bank sued
on the bond. The court denied recovery on the ground that
embezzlement was not "faithful" performance as required in
the bond. In disposing of the contention that the broad condi-
tions of the statute should be read into the bond the court said:
An attempt . . . to render this a statutory bond by
the elimination therefrom or the insertion therein of a word
or words which will effect a change in its purpose or meaning
and thereby render the sureties liable, is not authorized .2
Such was the state of the decisional law when Fogarty v.
Davis-° was certified to the Missouri Supreme Court. The
Fogarty case involved an action by materialmen against the
board of directors of a school district for failure to take a con-
tractor's bond conditioned according to section 1040 of the
25. Eau-Claire-St. Louis Lumber Co. v. Banks, 136 Mo. App. 44, 53, 117
S.W. 611, 614 (1909). The Eau-Claire case was cited as controlling in State
exr el. Sidenfaden v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 193 F.2d 47 (7th Cir.
1951). A bond was provided by the distributees of an estate where the
"decedent" was believed dead. Mo. REv. STAT. § 466.150 (1949). A re-
vivified "decedent" sued on the bond. Held: the statutory bond is for the
benefit of the officer of the probate court distributing the estate. Since
plaintiff was not named in the bond, he cannot recover on it.
26. Zellars v. National Surety Co., 210 Mo. 86, 108 S.W. 548 (1908).
27. See note 18 supra.
28. 272 Mo. 681, 199 S.W. 1025 (1917).
29. Id. at 697, 199 S.W. at 1029; cf. Board of Education of St. Louis v. U.
S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 155 Mo. App. 109, 118, 119, 134 S.W. 18, 20
(1911).
30. 305 Mo. 288, 264 S.W. 879 (1924). The Fogarty case was certified to
the Supreme Court by the Springfield Court of Appeals, 240 S.W. 888 (Mo.
App. 1922), because of a conflict with a decision of the Kansas City Court
of Appeals in Austin v. Ransdell, 207 Mo. App. 74, 230 S.W. 334 (1921).
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Missouri Revised Statutes of 1919.31 If the bond had not com-
plied with the statute the defendants would have been liable for
breach of a statutory ministerial duty.3 2 Plaintiff, believing
that the contractor had given bond in compliance with the
statute, had installed the plumbing and heating unit for the
public school. The bond actually given had provided that the
contractor shall perform all his obligations and that the surety
shall pay all damages or forfeitures sustained for any reason
by the principal's failure to execute his contract. The surety
was further obligated to keep the obligee-school district
• . . harmless and idemnified from and against all and
every claim, demand, judgment, lien, cost, and fee of every
description, . .. and shall repay obligee all sums of money
said obligee may pay to other persons on account of work
and labor done or materials furnished on or for said con-
tract. . ...
The bond was labeled "Statutory Bond," but the wrong printed
form was used. Obviously, the terms of the bond did not reiter-
ate the statute ' since there was no mention of laborers and
materialmen. It was held that the board of directors was not
liable since the bond was a statutory bond and plaintiffs could
recover on it in an action against the surety :3
* * * The rule in this State is that, in construing a statu-
tory bond, the provisions of the statutes must be read into it
and construed as a part of it. . . . This rule has been said to
apply to the statutory provisions . . . with respect to bonds
like that in this case. . . It is obvious the parties were act-
ing under the statute, and it is clear there was no other legal
obligation resting upon them which called for a bond of any
kind. The cited rule is applicable, and the bond given, when
contructed in its light, gives appellants an action upon it.36
Despite the fact that the Fogarty opinion ignored prior case
law where a contrary holding was on the merits and cited those
prior cases where the language was less in point,37 it would
31. Now Mo. REV. STAT. § 107.170 (1949). See note 3 supra.
32. Howard Fire Brick Co. v. Gammon, 204 S.W. 832 (Mo. App. 1918);
Burton Machinery Co. v. Ruth, 196 Mo. App. 459, 194 S.W. 526 (1917).
33. Fogarty v. Davis, 305 Mo. 288, 292, 264 S.W. 879, 880 (1924).
34. Mo. REv. STAT. § 107.170 (1949).35. At the suggestion of the court in Fogarty v. Davis, 305 Mo. 288,
264 S.W. 879 (1924), the school district subsequently sued the surety on
the bond and enjoyed a recovery. Cabool School District v. U. S. Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., 9 S.W.2d 103 (Mo. App. 1928).
36. Fogarty v. Davis, 305 Mo. 288, 293, 294, 295, 264 S.W. 879, 880, 881(1924), with citations of some of the cases in note 18 supra.
37. See note 18 supra.
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seem that the case had soundly settled the problem once and
for all in Missouri. And, to be sure, it was cited favorably soon
thereafter, albeit in dicta.38
However inviolate the Fogarty opinion may have seemed at
the time, it was soon to be subject to critical attack from no less
a source than the United States Court of Appeals for the Eigth
Circuit. In Southern Surety Co. v. United States Cast Iron Pipe
& Foundry Co.39 a materialman sued on a bond made out to
the city of King City, as obligee. The plaintiff had supplied
pipe and casting to the contractor for which he had never been
paid. The contractor had provided a bond which purported to
save the city harmless from loss suffered by virtue of the con-
tractor's breach of any covenants in the contract. On its face the
bond did not cover the payment of laborers and materialmen,
and therefore it did not comply with the terms of the statute. 0
The opinion does not make it clear whether the court applied
federal law or not,4 1 but it is plain that the cases cited were
Missouri cases, among them Fogarty v. Davis. In denying reco-
very the court distinguished the Fogarty case on the grounds
that (a) the terms of the bond were different and (b) the bond
in the Fogarty case plainly indicated that the parties intended
to comply with the terms of the statute:
But the Fogarty case is clearly distinguishable from the
instant case. Here the bond was not conditioned for the
performance of the contract, but only to save the city harm-
less from pecuniary loss resulting from a breach of the
contract on the part of the contractor. Manifestly the city
could suffer no pecuniary loss due to the failure of the con-
tractor to pay for materials, because there was no obliga-
tion on the part of the city to pay for such materials.
[I] n the instant case, there is nothing in the bond to
indicate that the parties intended to comply with the
provisions of the Missouri statute [Mo. REV. STAT. 1040
(1919)], and the bond neither actually nor substantially
conformed to the requirements of the statute.42
38. Metz v. Warrick, 217 Mo. App. 504, 511, 269 S.W. 626 (1925). The
court found that no contract existed between the school district and the
contractor so the bond failed for lack of consideration.
39. 13 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1926).
40. See note 3 supra.
41. "Of course the rights of the parties in this case are to be determined
in the light of the law as declared by the federal courts. .... " United States
v. Starr, 20 F.2d 803, 805 (4th Cir. 1927) (involving the instant problem).
42. Phillips, J., in Southern Surety Co. v. United States Cast Iron Pipe
& Foundry Co., 13 F.2d 833, 836 (8th Cir. 1926).
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Although it is true that in the Fogarty case the bond indicated
an intention to "comply with the provisions of the statute" (the
bond was labeled "Statutory Bond"), with deference the
remainder of the above distinction cannot be supported. It is
submitted that there is no substantial difference between a bond
conditioned "for the performance of the contract" (the provi-
sion in the Fogarty case) and a bond conditioned "to save the
city harmless from ,pecuniary loss resulting from a breach of
the contract on the part of the contractor." And if the distinc-
tion is to rest on the mere ritual of invoking or not invoking
the statute, it is indeed flimsy.
But the courts were not through. The particular terms of the
bond in the Fogarty case and its invocation of the statute were
not the only features of that decision which provided bases for
distinctions. The case was also found to be distinguishable
because its bond was "ambiguous." This was said to be the case
in St. Joseph v. Pfeiffer Stone Co.43 Plaintiff sued on the bond
to recover the cost of materials furnished a sub-contractor on
a public construction project. The bond, by its express terms,
permitted a recovery only to those who "had contracts directly
with the principal [contractor]." Plaintiff referred the court
to the Missouri statute which required a bond in such cases and
which stipulated that the bond should be conditioned for the
payment of labor and materials "whether by sub-contractor or
otherwise." 44 But the court denied recovery to the plaintiff,
holding that where the bond was clear and unambiguous, as in
this case, there was no need for interpretation as there was in
the Fogarty case:
.There is nothing in these cases [cited by the plaintiff]
holding that a court can interpret plain language of a bond
when there is no need for interpretation. In other words
these cases do not hold that the courts may construe a bond
to mean differently than expressly provided in the bond
actually taken.
. .It has been the policy of the courts of this state,
where the bond does not conform to the statute, to treat it as
a common law bond and to give it such construction as its
terms authorize regardless of the statute.
4 5
43. 224 Mo. App. 895, 26 S.W.2d 1018 (1930).
44. See note 3 supra.
45. St. Joseph v. Pfeiffer Stone Co., 224 Mo. App. 895, 897, 898, 26 S.W.2d
1018, 1019 1020 (1930). The cases raised by both parties have been men-
tioned previously in this article.
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In holding that a court will interpret the provisions of a con-
tract only when its language is plainly ambiguous the court
in the St. Joseph case was probably influenced by the Missouri
decisions involving insurance contracts. 6 In any event, the
patent result of the case is that a surety may circumvent the
bond statute simply by inserting in his bond express terriis
limiting or restricting its coverage in a clear and unambiguous
manner. Thus the St. Joseph case is directly contrary to the
holding of the New Hampshire court in the Keyser case47 in
holding that coverage expressly limited to those "having con-
tracts directly with the principal" takes the bond out of the
statutory category.
The St. Joseph decision started a trend which has not yet
been stemmed, much less reversed. In Portageville v. Fidelity
& Casualty Co. of New Yor01 the city sued on its treasurer's
fidelity bond which was required by statute.4 9 The statute broadly
required a bond conditioned on the treasurer's turning over all
moneys as required by law.5 0 The bond actually given, however,
expressly exempted the surety from liability for losses due to
the failure of the bank where the city's money was deposited.
The bank had failed, and the city had already been awarded
a priority in the bank's assets.5 1 Whether the court was swayed
by its knowledge of that award or not, it denied recovery to the
city on the bond. Although the St. Joseph case was available
as precedent, the court relied on two South Dakota cases which
46. In Adams v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 228 Mo. App. 915, 74S.W.2d 899 (1934), it was said:
It has been clearly, consistently, and repeatedly held that, where thelanguage of a policy is not ambiguous, but on the contrary is plain and
unequivocal, there is no room for construction, and that in such cases
the words employed in the policy must be given their usual and plain
meaning.Id. at 921, 74 S.W.2d 903. Cf. Stalion v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,
232 Mo. App. 467, 119 S.W.2d 30 (1938).
47. Petition of Leon Keyser, Inc., 89 A.2d 917 (N.H. 1952).
48. 228 Mo. App. 1, 63 S.W.2d 411 (1933).
49. Mo. REV. STAT. § 77.390 (1949) requires cities to demand a bond fromthe treasurer "conditioned for the faithful performance of his duty, andthat he will pay over all moneys belonging to the city as provided by
law...."
50. In Bragg City Special Road District v. Johnson, 323 Mo. 990, 20S.W.2d 22 (1929) it had been held that the treasurer of a road district is
an insurer of all district funds in his possession, whether in a bank deposit
or otherwise.
51. Portageville v. Harrison, 228 Mo. App. 27, 63 S.W.2d 410 (1933).
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were exactly in point.-' In one of them language was used
which must have met with the approval of the Missouri court:
... There is neither doubt nor ambiguity. The language of
the bond affirmatively exempts the surety from a certain
peril for which the statute contemplated that the surety on
the statutory bond should be answerable. The officer did not
comply with the law when he tendered such a bond, nor
did the approving body when they accepted it. Nevertheless,
it was tendered and approved. There is here no room for
presumption in any proper sense of the word. To "presume"
that the surety intended its obligation to be coextensive
with the contemplation of the statute would be flying
squarely in the face of the facts. The surety has very
plainly, definitely, and positively said that it did not so
intend. The situation then is one where the plain terms
of the contract impose a limitation upon liability, which
limitation the statute did not contemplate. 3
No Missouri cases were cited. But the court plainly rested its
decision on a mixture of the idea of unambiguity of the St.
Joseph case plus the idea of failure to invoke the statute of the
Southern Surety case. The reference to the parties' "intention"
clearly would seem to contemplate some sort of invocation of
the statute.-"
City of Sedalia v. Amnerican Surety Co. 5 again involved an
action by the city on the fidelity bond of its city collector. The
bond was required by an ordinance pursuant to the statute which
required that the bond be "conditioned for faithful performance
of his duty, and that he will pay over all moneys belonging to
the city as provided by law."' 3 The bond, however, was condi-
tioned on losses sustained through the collector's "Fraud, Dis-
honesty, Forgery, Theft, Embezzlement, Wrongful Abstraction
52. Murdo Township v. Townsend, 56 S.D. 576, 229 N.W. 935 (1930);
Thunder Hawk School District v. Western Surety Co., 58 S.D. 312, 235
N.W. 921 (1931).
53. Id. at 318, 235 N.W. at 923.
54. In an action on a bond identical to that in Portageville v. Harrison,
228 Mo. App. 27, 63 S.W.2d 410 (1933), the Court of Appeals allowed a
recovery, despite the fact that the plaintiff's loss was due to a bank failure,
on the ground that the evidence was clear that the parties really did not
intend that the clause limiting the surety's liability was to be of any force
or effect. However, the Supreme Court quashed the record of the Court
of Appeals since that court was found to have deviated from the record of
trial court and had decided the case in equity when it was presented and
tried as an action at law. State ex rel. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Allen,
85 S.W.2d 455 (Mo. 1935), quashing the record in Naylor Special Road
District v. Fidelity & Denosit Co., 75 S.W.2d 436 (Mo. App. 1934).
55. 82 F.2d 112 (8th Cir. 1936).
56. Mo. REv. STAT. § 77.390 (1949).
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or Wilful Misapplication." The Eight Circuit held that since
the city's loss was due to the failure of the depositary bank and
not to the collector's "Fraud, Dishonesty, [etc.]" there could
be no recovery on the bond. The court relied on the St. Joseph
and Citizens' Trust cases57 and refused to read the provisions
of the statute into the bond. The court quoted approvipgly
from the Citizens' Trust case as follows:
f ,.. The condition precedently necessary to the application
of this rule [the Fogarty rule] is ambiguity.. . An instru-
ment which speaks unmistakably in its own words leaves
no room for construction .... An attempt, . .. to render
this a statutory bond by the elimination therefrom or the
insertion therein of a word or words which will effect a
change in its purpose or meaning, and thereby render the
sureties liable, is not authorized. 8
The rule of the foregoing cases, from Southern Surety to City
of Sedalia, is apparently still extant in Missouri. They h6ld
that, before a statutory bond will be interpreted to coincide with
the statute, the following must be present in any given case:
(a) the terms of the bond must be like those in the Fogarty
bond, or, at least, (b) the language of the bond must be "ambi-
guous," and (c) the terms of the bond must indicate that the
parties intended that the bond was to be considered a statutory
bond.
The aforementioned elements were present and the Fogarty
doctrine was successfully pleaded in Camdenton Consolidated
School District v. New York Casualty Co. 59 A contract was
given for the construction of a school, and the contractor furn-
ished bond. o The bond did not recite the statutory conditions
but was almost identical with the Fogarty bond, except that it
was not labeled "Statutory Bond" as in the Fogarty case. It
was conditioned on "the faithful performance of the contract
and the payment of obligations arising thereunder."6' 1 Actually,
the bond was in that form which exists between a contractor
and a private individual, and merely purported to indemnify
57. St. Joseph ex rel. Consolidated Stone Co. v. Pfeiffer Stone Co., 224Mo. App. 895, 26 S.W.2d 1018 (1930); Citizens' Trust Co. v. Tindle, 272
Mo. 681, 199 S.W. 1025 (1917).
58. 82 F.2d 112, 114 (1936), quoting from the case of Citizens' Trust Co.
v. Tindle, 272 Mo. 681, 696, 199 S.W. 1025, 1028 (1917).
59. 340 Mo. 1070, 104 S.W.2d 319 (1937).
60. The statute is set out in full in note 3 supra.
61. Camdenton Consolidated School District ex rel. Powell Lumber Co. v.
New York Casualty Co., 340 Mo. 1070, 1074, 104 S.W.2d 319, 322 (1937).
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the obligee-school district if the contractor did not perform.
Plaintiff was a materialman who had furnished lumber for the
building. In permitting recovery the court relied heavily on
favorable decisions from other jurisdictions, 62 and, incidentally,
on the Fogarty case. The Southern Surety case63 was disposed
of by a short sentence which implied that it might have been
decided differently.64 At any rate, from all the circumstances,
the court stated that ". . . it is evident [that the bond] was
intended by all the parties to perform the office of the bond
required by the statute.... "' 5 Why the intention of the parties
was so "evident" was not made clear by the court. Indeed, on
the surface, their intention would seem to have been quite other-
wise since they used an ordinary private bond instead of the
statutory form. The court did not bother to distinguish prior
cases of the St. Joseph stripe. The case not only permitted
recovery by the materialman, but also by a creditor who had
loaned money to the contractor to enable the latter to meet his
payrolls, since this was deemed to come within the "labor"
coverage of the statute.66
62. West Virginia, Wisconsin, Mississippi, Arkansas and Nebraska. Id. at
1080-1082, 104 S.W.2d at 323-325.
63. Southern Surety Co. v. United States Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co.,
13 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1926).
64. "Under the facts in the Fogarty case the reasoning of the Circuit
Court of Appeals and its conclusion might well and soundly have been
made the basis of the decision therein." Camdenton Consolidated School
District ex rel. Powell Lumber Co. v. New York Casualty Co., 340 Mo. 1070,
1084, 104 S.W.2d 319, 326 (1937).
65. Id. at 1078, 104 S.W.2d at 323. The court, however backhandedly
suggested that the doctrine of the St. Joseph case was still good law in
Missouri:
We have, however, followed one line of conflicting authority and held
that without regard to the form or wording (the obligation of the
statute not being expressly excluded), when a bond is given under the
circumstances and in the situation shown in this case the statutory
condition will be read into it and the surety be held by virtue of the
statute .... [italics inserted].
Id. at 1093, 104 S.W.2d at 332.
66. Cf. Audrain County ex rel. First National Bank v. Walker, 236 Mo.
App. 627, 155 S.W.2d 251 (1941) in which a creditor of the contractor sued
on the bond for money loaned to pay for labor, materials, etc. There the
court said:
it would seem that it is amply clear that a person or bank furnish-
ing money or funds to a building contractor with which for him to
perform .. .was not within the contemplation of the Legislature as
shown by the statutory provisions, and, consequently, was not within
the contemplations of the parties to this action, as shown by the bond
which contained the statutory wording and followed the language of
such statute.
Id. at 636, 155 S.W.2d at 255. Despite this reference it is urged that this
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The doctrine of the Camdenton and Fogarty cases was
followed in State ex rel. Jefferson County v. Sheible0 7 The
county sued on its treasurer's official bond for money which was
alleged to have been wrongfully retained from the county. A
county treasurer must provide two bonds under the statutes.08
In the instant case the treasurer gave but one bond with twenty-
nine individul sureties. The bond was entitled "Official Bond."
Its terms were unusually vague69 and defendants (the sureties)
claimed it was merely a promise to give two bonds sometime
in the future. The court awarded recovery to the county:
•.. A literal reading of its condition would leave this im-
pression [that it was merely a promise to give two bonds].
However a bond to give a bond is neither known nor con-
templated by the statutes relating to the bonds to be given
by a treasurer.
* It is needless for us to comment on the awkwardness in
drafting the terms. Nevertheless, an intention to comply
with the requirements of the statute is apparent. . . . The
intention is further indicated by reference to "Rev. Stat.
6767." True, this section must refer to the Statutes of
1899 but in view of the circumstances even this discrepancy
in time is not surprising. This section is identical with the
present section . . . requiring the faithful performance
bond.70
In addition to relying on the Fogarty and Camdenton cases
the court also relied on two other more recent Missouri cases:
State v. Wipke7' and State v. Vienup.7 2 Both these cases involved
article is directed only to the question of interpretation of bonds and is not
directly concerned with the interpretation of the statutes.
67. 163 S.W.2d 559 (Mo. 1942).
68. Mo. RIv. STAT. §§ 10400, 13795 (1939). The provisions are sub-
stantially the same as §§54.070 and 54.160 of the 1949 Missouri Revised
Statutes.
69. The bond provided:
The condition of the above bond is such, however, that whereas, the
said Frank D. Sheible was, on the eighth day of November, 1932, duly(1) elected to the office of (3) Treasurer of the County of Jefferson in
the State of Missouri and has been duly commissioned. Now, therefore,
if the said Frank D. Sheible shall (2) give bond to the county "for the
faithful performance of the duties of his office." Rev. Stat. 6767. Also,
give bond to the State of Missouri "for the faithful disbursement,
according to law, of all such moneys as shall from time to time come
into his hands."--then this obligation to be void, otherwise to remain
in full force and effect.
State ex rel. Jefferson County v. Sheible, 163 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Mo. 1942).
70. Ibid.
71. 345 Mo. 283, 133 S.W.2d 345 (1939).
72. 347 Mo. 382, 147 S.W.2d 627 (1941).
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an interpretation of section 19 of the Liquor Control Act of
1933 as amended- and whether any bond required by that act
could be sued on for breach for the full amount thereof without
a showing of actual damage to the state:
... The sole question involved is whether or not the State
may recover the full penalty of the bond without proving
that it was damaged as a result of the principal's breach of
the bond.7 4
The question for our determination therefore is this: Is
the bond sued upon one of forfeiture or one of indemnity? 75
Since the sole question in each case was the interpretation of
the statute, and since there was no dispute that the bond was
intended to be a statutory bond, the following language in the
Vienup case, though sound, was not necessary to the result:
... Under the well-settled rule in this State, any required
provisions of the condition of the bond found in the statute
but omitted from the instrument itself must be read into
it, and, conversely, terms which are found in the condition
of the bond but not in the statute are to be disregarded.78
Thus neither the Sheible, Wipke, nor Vienup case affects any
prior decisional doctrine.
Briefly, then, where the coverage of a statutory bond is more
restricted than the provisions of the applicable statute, the
existing state of the law in Missouri seems to be as follows:
Before the conditions of the statute will be read into the bond
the parties must have intended that it be a statutory bond and
this intention may be presumed from the surrounding circum-
stances. If the bond is ambiguous this presumption may arise,
and the courts will be prone to interpret the bond in accordance
with the provisions of the statute. However, where the language
of the bond is clear, the parties will be deemed conclusively
to intend what the bond stipulates, and the coverage of the
bond as written will not be enlarged. The language of the bonds
in the Fogarty, Camdenton, and Sheible cases seems to provide
the requisite ambiguity.
II.
As stated previously, 77 the New Hampshire Supreme Court
held that those provisions of a bond which are additional to
73. Mo. Laws Ex. Sess. 1933-1934, p. 77.
74. State v. Wipke, 345 Mo. 283 288, 133 S.W.2d 354, 355 (1939).
75. State v. Vienup, 347 Mo. 382, 386, 147 S.W.2d 627, 628 (1941).
76. Ibid.
77. Text supported by footnotes 11 - 13 supra.
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the requirements of the statute will be enforced as common law
obligations. But they will be enforced only as to those parties
actually contemplated in the bond's express coverage, not as to
those whose claims depended solely upon the statute.8 Thus
a variation of the aforementioned issue arises, viz., the surety
bond contains clauses and offers protection in addition to, rather
than restrictive of, that stipulated by the statute. It may be
that the official has complied with the obligations of that part
of the bond which complies with the statute but has committed
some other dereliction of duty which, in fact, is expressly
covered by the terms of the bond actually issued. If the obli-
gations of the surety are supported by a valid consideration, there
is no reason why the additional obligations should not be
enforced. How would a Missouri court handle the case?
State to Use of Hubbard & Moffitt Commission Co. V. Coch-
rane79 involved an action on a warehouseman's bond required
by statute. The bond afforded more protection to the obligee
than the statute required. There was some discussion as to
whether the applicable statute had not been declared unconsti-
tutional along with some general statutes relating to the inspec-
tion of warehouses. The court inferred that the statute was
still valid, but whether it was or not, the bond was enforceable
as a common law obligation with respect to the extrastatutory
provisions:
[ , T] he fact that the bond in question embodied condi-
tions to comply with the statutory regulations does not pre-
vent the enforcement of other obligations expressed which,
though not prescribed by the statute, were the common law
duties attached to the business of public warehousemen. 0
This result is consistent with many Missouri cases holding that,
regardless of a statute, a bond will be enforced as a common
law obligation in accordance with its express terms.8' This is
particularly true where, as here, the party suing is clearly
covered by the terms of the bond anyway. Cases like the
Cochrane case are to be distinguished from cases like the St.
Joseph case8 2 in that here there was a plain intention to comply
78. Petition of Leon Keyser, Inc., 89 A.2d 917, 921 (N.H. 1952).
79. 264 Mo. 581, 175 S.W. 599 (1915).
80. Id. at 593, 175 S.W. at 602.
81. See note 19 suCpra.
82. St. Joseph ex ret. Consolidated Stone Co. v. Pfeiffer Stone Co., 224
Mo. App. 895, 26 S.W.2d 1018 (1930).
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with the statute albeit additional protection was voluntarily
included in the bond.
In School Consolidated District v. Wilson" a school district
brought an action on a bond provided by its depositary bank.
The bank had not complied with the applicable statutes 4 and
thus had not qualified as a depositary of public funds. The bond
issued by the surety covered ". . . all funds of said District,
including funds belonging to said District. ... 85 The bank
failed, and the school district sued on the bond. The surety
claimed that, since the bank was unqualified, there was never
a debtor-creditor relationship created as contemplated by the
parties and the bond was void for lack of consideration. It
was decided that, if the sureties had given merely a statutory
bond, they would not have been liable for the illegal deposit but
that the terms of the bond, broader than the statute required,
included the risks resulting from a deposit in an unqualified
depositary.
This decision would seem to follow the result in the Cochrane
case. However, it must be noted that this court pointed out
that the record did not disclose any compliance or attempt to
comply with the statute.8 6 Such was not the situation in the
Cochrane case. It would seem, however, that the circumstances
of the giving of the bond would raise a presumption that the
parties intended to comply with the statute. 7 Thus, at least
with respect to the lack of an intention to abide by the statute,
this case compares favorably with the St. Joseph and Portage-
ville cases8 which also held the bonds non-statutory and enforce-
able as common law obligations. But, to the surety, the differ-
ences .are far more important than the similarities; in one he
wins, in the other he loses. On the basis of this case it would
seem that, if, as here, the language of the bond is clear, the
courts in Missouri will not interpret the bond so as to diminish
83. 345 Mo. 598, 135 S.W.2d 349 (1939); 26 WASH. U.L.Q. 127 (1941).
84. Mo. Rnv. STAT. §§ 9362, 12184-12198 (1929).
85. School Consolidated District v. Wilson, 345 Mo. 598, 603, 135 S.W.2d
349, 351 (1935).
86. Ibid.
87. Camdenton Consolidated School District ex rel. Powell Lumber Co.
v. New York Casualty Co., 340 Mo. 1070, 104 S.W.2d 319 (1937).
88. Portageville v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 228 Mo. App.
1, 63 S.W.2d 411 (1933); St. Joseph ex rel. Consolidated Stone Co. v.
Pfeiffer Stone Co., 224 Mo. App. 895, 26 S.W.2d 1018 (1930).
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its coverage. As stated previously, neither will the courts inter-
pret such a bond so as to enlarge its coverage.
But any clarity in this particular area has been severely
tested by the decision in State ex rel. Sanders v. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co.89 A customer brought an action on
a broker's bond, the bond having been required by statute.90 The
bond, according to the statute, was to be conditioned on the
broker's performing in accordance with the provisions and
requirements of the Missouri Securities Act.01 The broker had
sold plaintiff's stock at plaintiff's request but had failed to return
the money to the plaintiff. Instead, without awaiting plaintiff's
instructions, he had used that money to buy and sell more stock
for the plaintiff, by virtue of which plaintiff suffered loss. The
broker's bond, instead of merely reiterating the provisions of the
statute, contained additional protection, viz., that the broker
"must properly account for all moneys or securities received from
or belonging to" the plaintiff. Such a provision was not one of the
brokers' requirements found in the Missouri Securities Act.
Although the terms of the bond were plainly unambiguous, the
court refused recovery to the plaintiff, holding that since the
provisions exceeded the terms of a bond required by statute,
this particular provision is unenforceable. The opinion does
not mention the case of School Consolidated District v. Wilson
but relies on the Fogarty and Camdenton cases.9 2 While those
cases held that the provisions of the statute may be read into
the bond, they required a condition precedent to such interpre-
tation-"ambiguity." This requirement was established by the
St. Joseph case, 93 among others. But this court purports to
distinguish the St. Joseph case by raising an ultra vires question:
. We conclude that the case at bar is distinguished from
the above cases in that the executing agency herein is a
creature of the statutes with no power to exact beyond
the limitations prescribed by the statute.94
89. 235 Mo. App. 729, 143 S.W.2d 483 (1940).
90. Mo. REv. STAT. § 7744 (1929).
91. Mo. Rrv. STAT. §§ 7724-7757 (1929).
92. Camdenton Consolidated School District ex rel. Powell Lumber Co. v.
New York Casualty Co., 340 Mo. 1070, 104 S.W.2d 319 (1937); Fogarty v.
Davis, 305 Mo. 288, 264 S.W. 879 (1924).
93. St. Joseph ez rel. Consolidated Stone Co. v. Pfeiffer Stone Co., 224
Mo. App. 895, 26 S.W.2d 1018 (1930).
94. State ex rel. Sanders v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 235 Mo.
App. 729, 735, 143 S.W.2d 483, 485 (1940).
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By "executing agency" the court was referring to the official
whose duty it is to exact and approve statutory bonds. In this
case the "executing agency" was the Secretary of State whereas
in the St. Joseph case it was a city official. To say that they are
materially different because the Secretary of State "is a crea-
ture of the statutes with no power to exact beyond the limita-
tions prescribed by the statute" seems not only to be erroneous
but also to be a frivolous application of the ultra vires doctrine
where it was not necessary. To read "limitations" into the
statute in this sense is to re-draft the statute for no perceptibly
useful purpose. 95 The court made no mention of the lack of
ambiguity in this bond. In short, the distinction seems without
merit.
The Sanders case might be isolated because of the unfortunate
ultra vires ingredient were it not for another factor: the deci-
sion relies on an Iowa case as controlling. In United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Iowa Telephone Co.96 a contractor
was hired to construct telephone wires for the city. The con-
tractor provided a bond as required by an ordinance, but whereas
the ordinance required only that the bond cover the restoration
of streets and alleys, the bond actually given also covered
maintenance of the telephone poles and wires after completion.
In an action on the bond for failure to maintain the installations
the Iowa court denied recovery. A bond which failed to comply
with a statute or ordinance would be enforced as a common
law obligation, but not so a bond which, as here, contained
additional clauses:
And it would be an anomalous holding to say that a bond
may be enforced as a statutory obligation and also as an
obligation at common law .... 97
Since the Sanders case quoted this statement with approval,98
the decision is in conflict with prior cases discussed above. In
passing, it should be noted that Iowa has a remedial statute99
which provides that bonds given pursuant to statutes will always
be interpreted as though they contained the statutory conditions.
95. The New Hampshire court found no such limitations in Petition of
Leon Keyser, Inc., 89 A.2d 917 (N.H. 1952).
96. 174 Iowa 476, 156 N.W. 727 (1916).
97. Id. at 495, 156 N.W. at 733.
98. State ex rel. Sanders v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 235 Mo.
App. 729, 736, 143 S.W.2d 483, 485 (1940).
99. IowA CODE ANN. § 64.5 (1949).
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Missouri has no such statute. It may well be that the Iowa
statute influenced the decision in that case and that the reliance
on it in the Sanders decision may have been ill-advised.
In summary, it seems to be obvious that the present Missouri
law in this area leaves something to be desired. It is certainly
difficult to reconcile the Sanders opinion with the decisions of
the Missouri Supreme Court in the Cochrane case and in School
Consolidated District v. Wilson. The bonds in all three cases
clearly and unambiguously created a coverage which was broader
than the applicable statute required. In none of the statutes
which were involved was there any provision prohibiting the giv-
ing of bonds containing protection in addition to that stipulated
by statute. As a matter of the interpretation and enforcement of
contracts, if for no other reason, it would seem that the addi-
tional clauses should be enforceable against the surety. The
Sanders case disagrees.
III.
Any review of the Missouri cases on interpretation of statu-
tory bonds seems to point up at least one underlying question:
What inferences, if any, should be drawn from the fact that a
corporation, for a compensation, and with knowledge of a
pertinent statute, has undertaken to guarantee that some official
or public contractor will perform his statutory duties? What-
ever the inferences, leaving their determination solely to the
courts would seem to have worked out somewhat less than
satisfactorily in Missouri. This applies whether the bond in
question contained coverage restrictive of the statute or whether
the surety hiad voluntarily gone beyond the statutory require-
ments. To be sure, rough patterns may be drawn from case to
case, but too often they rest on grounds which are highly ten-
uous, at best. The result is that too few reasonable expectations
as to liability have been evolved from the case law. The orderly
development of the law is evidenced most eloquently when con-
tracting parties are permitted to realize their reasonable expec-
tations.
It is submitted that Missouri could well use a remedial statute
which would be a guide to the courts in interpreting and enfor-
cing any particular statutory bond. Of course, a remedial
statute which merely provided that a statutory bond, though
defective, would not be void would be useless in Missouri. Such is
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already accepted law.',, And a remedial statute whose language
is obscured either because of awkward draftsmanship or the
insertion of compromise clauses would give rise to more litiga-
tion than it would avoid. A statute like that of Iowa, on the
other hand, might put to rest much conflicting precedent:
All bonds required by law shall be construed as impliedly
containing the conditions required by statute, anything in
the terms of said bonds to the contrary notwithstanding. 0 '
Although such a statute would tend to settle the question where
the bond was more restricted than the statute, it might not
reach the situation where the conditions of the bond go beyond
the requirements of the statute. Since the case law is unhar-
monious in this field a Missouri statute might very well contain
the additional words "at least" so that it would read as follows:
All bonds required by law shall be construed as at least
impliedly containing the conditions required by statute,
anything in the terms of said bonds to the contrary not-
withstanding.
There is little doubt any longer that the modern surety has
surrendered his former favored status in the courts. This does
not mean, however, that he should be treated any more harshly
than any Qther compensated insurer, if indeed he has been.
There would seem to be no serious objection to holding him to
his full liability under his contracts as executed, or his contracts
which a statute has plainly said he should have executed before
accepting a premium.
100. State to Use of Hubbard & Moffitt Commission Co. v. Cochrane, 264
Mo. 581, 175 S.W. 599 (1915); State ex rel. Jean v. Horn, 94 Mo. 162, 7
S.W. 116 (1888); Portageville v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 228
Mo. App. 1, 63 S.W.2d 411 (1933); St. Joseph ex rel. Consolidated Stone
Co., v. Pfeiffer Stone Co., 224 Mo. App. 895, 26 S.W.2d 1018 (1930) ; Nations
v. Beard, 216 Mo. App. 33, 267 S.W. 19 (1924); La Crosse Lumber Co. v.
Schwartz, 163 Mo. App. 659, 147 S.W. 501 (1912).
101. IOWA CODr. ANN. § 64.5 (1949).
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